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REPULSED BY RAP? RENEWAL OPTIONS ARE SINGING A 
DIFFERENT TUNE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF BLEECKER STREET TENANTS CORP. V. 





In Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones LLC,
 1 the 
New York Court of Appeals held that options to renew in a lease, re-
gardless of duration, are not subject to New York‟s statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities (hereinafter “RAP”).2  Never before had the 
Court of Appeals fully exempted an entire interest from the grasp of 
RAP.3  Even so, Bleecker Street is the third substantial decision by 
New York‟s highest court to hinder RAP‟s ability to void land inter-
ests.4 
An analysis of Bleecker Street requires an evaluation of RAP 
at common law, in the New York statutes, and in the New York 
Court of Appeal‟s rulings, which have previously limited the current 
statutory interpretation.5  This Comment analyzes the court‟s reason-
 
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.B.A. 2010, 
Hofstra University.  I would like to thank Professor Seplowitz for the inspiration to pursue 
this subject and for her guidance throughout the writing process.  I also want to thank my 
mother and grandmother for their continued love and support throughout my life; all of my 
successes are due to their constant encouragement. 
1 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 Id. at 487. 
3 See Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 805 (N.Y. 1996) 
(stating that in limited circumstances of preemptive rights, “enforcement [of the right] would 
promote the purposes underlying [RAP]”). 
4 The other two cases are Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (holding that the ap-
purtenant exemption to RAP applied to purchase options) and Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bru-
ken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 385 (N.Y. 1986) (holding RAP does not apply to com-
mercial and governmental preemptive rights). 
5 See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (stating that the appurtenant exemp-
tion could save certain purchase options even if they would otherwise vest beyond the statu-
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ing for exempting the entirety of lease renewal options from RAP as 
opposed to extending previously created doctrines.  Furthermore, this 
Comment suggests a different reasoning that the majority could have 
used to quell the criticisms of the concurring and dissenting opinions.  
Part II discusses the history of RAP, its common law purposes, and 
New York‟s statutory adoption of the rule.  Part III examines two 
previous New York Court of Appeals cases which limited RAP‟s ap-
plication to contingent rights.  Part IV reviews the treatment of re-
newal options by New York courts before the Bleecker Street deci-
sion.  Part V examines the reasoning of the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions of Bleecker Street.  Part VI analyzes the Bleecker 
Street decision‟s consistency with other New York Court of Appeals 
opinions, the effects of the case on landlords and tenants, addresses 
the concerns of the concurring and dissenting opinions, and suggests 
an alternative approach the majority could have taken to reach the 
same conclusion while alleviating the concerns of the concurring and 
dissenting judges. Part VII briefly concludes.  The Bleecker Street 
decision is the continuation of numerous changes to a common law 
rule that is respected, feared, and criticized by the legal community.6 
II. HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
A. The Common Law Rule Emerges 
As King Henry VIII of England lavished himself with the 
pleasantries of the English Court, his financial problems grew along 
with his waistline.7  To alleviate these financial woes, the King in-
creasingly leaned on Parliament to find new and clever ways to sus-
tain his lifestyle.  For instance, in 1535, Parliament reluctantly passed 
 
tory perpetuities period); Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d 828, 834 (N.Y. 
1992) (holding that RAP does not apply to personal property interests in commercial transac-
tions); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 384 (finding preemptive rights in government and commercial 
transactions are exempt from RAP). 
6 Anderson v. 50 East 72nd St. Condo., 505 N.Y.S.2d 101, 106 (App. Div. 1986) (“[RAP] 
is frequently viewed as a regressive relic of the dim and distant past, a principle to be 
avoided or evaded, if at all possible.”); George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead 
Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 20 
(1977) (“The Rule Against Perpetuities is among the oldest, most respected, and difficult to 
understand rules of the common law.”). 
7 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 190, 267 (7th ed. 2010). 
2
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the Statute of Uses which had the outward appearance of preventing 
land abuse from the previously required use of feoffees, but actually 
was intended to provide additional taxation for the Crown.8  While 
the passage of the act led to much resistance, the King and Parliament 
furthered their commitment to taxation by passing the Statute of 
Wills in 1540.9  This act allowed landowners, for the first time, to de-
vise their land to the people they chose at death.10  Of course, it also 
allowed the property to escheat to the Crown if the decedent had no 
living relatives.11 
These two acts of Parliament caused many landholders to at-
tempt to restrict alienability of their property by ensuring that proper-
ty would remain in the family for generations after their deaths.12  
What resulted were property interests that restricted ownership, mar-
ketability, and usage for present and future owners of property, po-
tentially in perpetuity.13  Meanwhile, the English courts fought the 
use of such restrictions as hindering the “free and ready transfer of 
property.”14  Over the next few generations, the courts struck down 
land transfers that were found to create a perpetuity;15 but, judges 
constantly struggled to determine a bright line rule on what consti-
tuted a perpetuity.16  In 1681, a compromise was reached between 
landholders and the courts in The Duke of Norfolk’s Case,17 which 
created the rule against perpetuities.18  This rule was meant to pro-
mote the development and use of land while still allowing property 
owners to retain some control for limited subsequent generations.19  
At its founding, RAP was “a flexible balancing principle.”20 
 
8 Id. at 267-68. 
9 See Anderson, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (stating that RAP “was a necessary response” to the 
Statute of Wills). 
10 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 9 (8th ed. 2009). 
11 State by Furman v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 178 A.2d 329, 336 (N.J. 1962) (stating 
the revenue from escheat was well recognized in the statutes of wills). 
12 Haskins, supra note 6, at 29. 
13 Anderson, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
14 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381. 
15 See Haskins, supra note 6, at 35 (“[T]he judges of the king‟s courts had been fighting 
against perpetuities long before the first enunciation of [RAP].”). 
16 See id. at 43. 
17 (1681) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch); 3 Chan. Cas. 1. 
18 Anderson, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
19 Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 832-33. 
20 Id. at 833; Haskins, supra note 6, at 43 (stating a perpetuity under The Duke of Nor-
folk‟s Case was an interest that “would not last too long, and the test of „too long‟ became 
3
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B. Early Developments of the New York Rule 
As the common law rule developed, RAP became a much 
more rigid formula and the validity of a property transfer was deter-
mined exclusively by a specific time limitation. Chancellor Kent, the 
highest judge in New York at the time, stated the common law devel-
opment best: 
The courts of justice have . . . wisely and steadily de-
termined that they would not permit [contingent inter-
ests] to tie up property beyond a moderate and reason-
able period.  They have determined that the 
contingency of an [interest] must happen within a life, 
or lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards. 
This is the utmost length to which property can be so 
tied up . . . and if it attempts to go beyond that limit, it 
is void.21 
The possibility that the estate may vest beyond the perpetuities period 
voids the interest from its inception; “it is immaterial how the fact ac-
tually turns out.”22  New York pursued this common law rule, as de-
veloped by the courts following The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, until the 
New York legislature altered the rule by statute.23 
In 1830, the New York legislature passed a statute that sub-
stantially altered common law RAP as it applied within the state.24  
The statute limited the drafter‟s control to two lives in being.25 Addi-
tionally, in regard to real property, a period of minority was utilized 
to extend the statutory perpetuity limit if the holder of the remainder 
 
whatever was inconveniently long”). 
21 Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. Ch. 382, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (emphasis added).  
Years later, Professor John Chipman Gray simplified the common law articulation of RAP as 
“[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some 
life in being at the creation of the interest.”  John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetui-
ties at 166 (2d ed. 1906). 
22 Anderson, 16 Johns. Ch. at 403. 
23 See Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803 (stating that New York created its first 
statutory RAP law in 1830). 
24 Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446, 450-51 (1883) (“[S]uccessive estates for life shall not be 
limited unless to persons in being at creation thereof; and where a remainder shall be limited 
on more than two successive estates for life all the life estates subsequent to those of the two 
persons first entitled thereto shall be void.”) (quoting 1 R.S. 723, § 17). 
25 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803; In re Wilcox, 87 N.E. 497, 499 (N.Y. 1909). 
4
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interest was a minor.26  The legislative intent for such a unique 
change was “to enact some further limitation on the power to create 
future estates.”27  Interestingly, unlike the common law rule, the sta-
tutory rule limited the number of future interests that could be 
created, and invalidated any subsequent interests regardless of 
whether the interest holder was alive at the transfer or how long the 
interest lasted.28  Furthermore, RAP did not apply to all interests, but 
it did exclude all options.29  The statute was considered so unnecessa-
rily complex and different from the common law rule that courts 
found little logical connection between the two.30  Due to the statute‟s 
very narrow scope, New York courts conceded that many transfers 
that would have fallen under the common law rule were now free to 
be created by grantors without repercussion.31 
C. The Current New York Law 
After much criticism and confusion over the wording and 
meaning of the statute, the New York legislature enacted a series of 
revisions between 1958 and 1965.32  What resulted was a codified re-
surrection of common law RAP in New York which continues in 
force today.33  The statute reads: 
 
26 Greenland v. Waddell, 22 N.E. 367, 370 (N.Y. 1889) (finding a trust void for failure to 
meet the two lives in being condition of RAP).  See also Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 
at 803; In re Wilcox, 87 N.E. at 499 (stating that the statute discontinued the twenty-one year 
period and replaced it with a minority period for real estate perpetuity determinations). 
27 In re Wilcox, 87 N.E. at 500. 
28 Purdy, 92 N.Y. at 451 (“[A] remainder shall be limited on more than two successive 
estates for life[;] all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled there-
to shall be void . . . .” (quoting 1 R. S. 723, § 17) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
29 See, e.g., Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d 457, 463 (App. Div. 1982), 
aff’d, Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 447 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1983); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 
382 (noting that RAP would not apply to the provision at issue before 1965, regardless of 
whether that provision was an option or a preemptive right); Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 
N.E.2d at 281 (Read, J., concurring). 
30 See In re Wilcox, 87 N.Y. at 500 (questioning the reasoning of various sections in the 
statute, claiming “they added nothing” to the aforementioned sections, and jesting that per-
haps “the revisers were under delusion as to their necessity”); Purdy, 92 N.Y. at 451 (stating 
that the statute has “no necessary connection with the law of perpetuities”). 
31 Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (stating that options to purchase were not cov-
ered under the 1830 statute); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 382 (reasoning that options to purchase 
and preemptive rights were both valid under the 1830 statute). 
32 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803. 
33 Id.; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 382.  There are some modifications.  For example, a pre-
sumption that only men over fourteen and women between the ages of twelve and fifty-five 
5
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No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, 
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after one or 
more lives in being at the creation of the estate and 
any period of gestation involved. In no case shall lives 
measuring the permissible period of vesting be so des-
ignated or so numerous as to make proof of their end 
unreasonably difficult.34 
The statutory change in revoking the requirements of two lives in be-
ing and the period of minority shows that the legislature specifically 
intended to incorporate the American common law rules governing 
perpetuities into the New York statute.35  New York‟s purpose in co-
difying the common law rule was the same as that in The Duke of 
Norfolk’s Case nearly 300 years prior: to promote land development 
and provide greater alienation of property.36  Since its inception, the 
statutory rule has been continually proclaimed “inflexible, measured 
solely by the passage of time.”37  No longer is the rule a balancing 
test as originally conceptualized at English common law.38  In accor-
dance with this rigidity, RAP cannot be waived by agreement of the 
parties, and if a violation occurs, a court will invalidate the entire 
provision.39 
If an interest extends beyond the perpetuities period it is not 
necessarily void under New York‟s RAP law.  New York‟s Estate 
Powers & Trusts Law (EPTL) § 9-1.3, commonly referred to as “the 
„saving statute,‟ ”40 presumes that “the creator intended the estate to 
be valid.”41  The statute further provides that if the vesting of an in-
 
can produce children.  N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e)(1) (McKinney 2012). 
34 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 2012). 
35 Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (reviewing the legislative history). 
36 Kaiser-Haidri v. Battery Place Green, LLC, 925 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560 (App. Div. 2011) 
(quoting Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 475). 
37 Inwood Park Apartments, Inc. v. Coinmach Indus. Co., 783 N.Y.S.2d 453, 457 (Sup. 
Ct. 2004); see also Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 803 (claiming New York‟s statutory 
RAP law is “a rigid formula” unlike the common law rule which “evaluate[d] the reasona-
bleness of the restraint based on its duration [and] purpose”). 
38 See Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 649 (stating that RAP originated as an ad hoc 
balancing principle which over time “acquired rigid encrustations” as a reaction to modern 
transactions). 
39 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381. 
40 See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806; TDNI Props., LLC v. Saratoga 
Glen Builders, LLC, 914 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (App. Div. 2011). 
41 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 2012). 
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terest is dependent upon “any specified contingency, it shall be pre-
sumed that the creator of [the interest] intended such contingency to 
occur, if at all, within twenty-one years from the effective date of the 
instrument creating such estate.”42  The policy of such a rule is to 
protect interests that violate RAP on their face, but that typically take 
a short time to vest.43  However, the saving statute does not allow for 
an “extensive rewriting of [an] option agreement . . . to make it con-
form to the permissible period”;44 nor can it be used to insert a time 
limitation when no time restrictions appear.45 
III. PAST RAP EXEMPTIONS BY THE NEW YORK COURT OF 
APPEALS 
Following the enactment of the current statute, the New York 
courts have been called upon, on numerous occasions, to interpret its 
meaning.46  In particular, the reasoning behind two previous Court of 
Appeals cases, Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Bruken 
Realty Corp.47 and Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc.,48 
help illuminate its determination in Bleecker Street. 
A. Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Bruken 
Realty Corp. 
In 1986, the Court of Appeals sought to determine RAP‟s ap-
plicability to preemptive rights (also referred to as rights of first re-
 
42 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 2012). 
43 Rozina v. Casa 74th Dev. LLC, 907 N.Y.S.2d 603, 607 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding that an 
option to purchase a condominium unit was valid because it was to take place on a to-be-
determined closing date and closings are “expected to occur within a relatively short period 
of time after the date of execution of the Option Agreement”).  But see Symphony Space, 
Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 807-08 (holding that the parties‟ expectation that the purchase option 
would be exercised within the statutory period does not validate an option that expressly al-
lows the holder to exercise the option three years beyond the perpetuities period). 
44 Symphony Space, Inc, 669 N.E.2d at 807; TDNI Props., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 748. 
45 TDNI Props., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49 (reasoning that the lack of any time limitation, 
paired with the express terms letting the option pass to the holders‟ heirs and assignees, 
shows an intent to allow the option to last in perpetuity). 
46 See, e.g., Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d 484; Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d 
799; Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d 828; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d 379.  A simple Westlaw 
search yields approximately 150 New York cases discussing RAP since the enactment of 
the1965 amended statute. 
47 492 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1986). 
48 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996). 
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fusal).49  In this case, the MTA and Bruken‟s predecessor entered into 
an “option agreement”50 giving the predecessor a ninety-nine year 
right to purchase property, at market value, if and when the MTA de-
cided it was unnecessary for its operations.51  After Bruken was as-
signed the right, the MTA concluded it no longer required the proper-
ty and Bruken sought to exercise its right.52  The MTA brought a 
declaratory judgment action to determine if the right was void under 
RAP.53 
The court held that preemptive rights within government and 
commercial transactions should be exempt from the statutory RAP 
law for public policy concerns.54  In its ruling, the court first noted 
the policy reasons under common law RAP were to “ensure the pro-
ductive use and development of property by its current beneficial 
owners by simplifying ownership, facilitating exchange and freeing 
property from unknown or embarrassing impediments to alienabili-
ty.”55  The court thereafter noted that EPTL § 9-1.1 was an “inflexi-
ble” rule, “measured solely by the passage of time.”56  Yet while 
commenting on this inflexibility, the court found that the utility of the 
rule was offset by “modern legal transactions,” which allow for an 
exemption of preemptive rights from the rule.57  The court reasoned 
that enforcement of the right actually promoted the underlying policy 
reasons for RAP by encouraging the holder of the right to develop the 
property and ensure his ability to recoup his investment.58  The court 
found this to be particularly true in government and business transac-
tions, reasoning that neither “lives in being” nor “twenty one years” 
 
49 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d 379. 
50 Though the parties called their agreement an “option agreement,” the court determined 
that what Bruken‟s predecessor purchased, and what Bruken was assigned, was in fact a 
preemptive right.  Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 382.  The difference between an option and a 
preemptive right is that an option holder can force the property owner into honoring his op-
tion right, whereas a preemptive right only requires the owner to give the holder a right of 
first refusal when a predetermined condition is satisfied.  See, e.g., id. (distinguishing be-
tween options and preemptive rights). 
51 Id. at 380. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 381. 
54 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 385. 
55 Id. at 381 (citing De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 494 (1852)). 
56 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381. 
57 Id. at 383. 
58 Id. at 383-84. 
8
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are relevant in such transactions.59  Subsequently, the court extended 
the scope of this ruling by exempting preemptive rights regarding 
personal property in commercial transactions from RAP.60 
B. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc. 
Ten years later, the court was confronted with whether New 
York‟s statutory RAP law should apply to commercial options to 
purchase.61  In this case, the parties devised a complex arrangement 
to provide mutually beneficial tax exemptions in which Symphony 
Space purchased property and leased it back to the original owner, 
Broadwest Realty Corp.62  As part of this transaction, the original 
owner was granted an option to repurchase the property up to twenty-
four years after the sale.63  Furthermore, the option to purchase was 
written as a separate agreement and stated that the right to exercise 
the option was unconditional and not dependent on any other obliga-
tions between the parties other than rent past-due at the time of clos-
ing.64  The original owner transferred its right to purchase to Pergola 
Properties, Inc. (“Pergola”).65  When Pergola attempted to exercise its 
option, Symphony Space brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the option violated RAP and was therefore void.66 
The Court of Appeals quoted Bruken on the importance of 
RAP and the policy reasons for its enforcement.67  The court rea-
soned that because an option to purchase can allow the holder to pur-
chase the property at any time, and even perhaps at a preset price 
 
59 Id. at 384.  The court did not discuss RAP as it applies to options. 
60 Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 833-34 (holding that an agreement regarding artwork 
between an art dealer and art collector constituted a “significant commercial interest” which 
did not hinder the public policy rights of RAP because it “facilitate[ed] broader marketing of 
world-renowned art treasures while posing . . . only a minimal limitation on the alienability 
of the works”).  In Morrison v. Piper, the court declined to extend the exemption to preemp-
tive rights in residential transactions. 556 N.E.2d 643, 646 (N.Y. 1990). 
61 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 800. 
62 Id. at 800-01.  This sale and lease-back transaction would allow Symphony Space to 
receive a sizable tax exemption allowing it to use the property at minimal cost; meanwhile, 
Broadwest would see a reduction in real estate taxes while retaining a substantial rental in-
come.  Id. 
63 Id. at 801. 
64 Id. at 801-02. 
65 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 802. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 803 (stating RAP seeks freedom of alienability and simplification of ownership). 
9
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lower than market value, it “creates a disincentive for the landowner 
to develop the property and hinders its alienability.”68  Such an effect 
defeats the common law policy of RAP, which EPTL § 9-1.1 is in-
tended to replicate.69  The court further made a distinction between its 
ruling in Bruken, exempting preemptive rights in commercial and 
government contracts from RAP, and its current holding that options 
to purchase are not exempt.70  However, the court failed to articulate 
precisely whether its holding was to apply to all options generally or 
only to options to purchase.71 
The court articulated the possibility that an option to purchase 
may be valid even though its interest may vest beyond the statutory 
RAP period.72  The court stated that if an option originated in the 
lease, cannot be exercised after the lease expires, and cannot be sepa-
rated from the lease, it will be exempt from RAP as an “appendant” 
or “appurtenant” option (appurtenant option).73  The common law 
public policy reasons for RAP, again, were the motives for exemption 
of particular interests from New York‟s statutory RAP law.74  The 
court found that appurtenant options encourage the holder to “invest 
in maintaining and developing the property by guaranteeing the op-
tion holder the ultimate benefit of any such investment,” much like 
the reasoning for exempting preemptive options in Bruken.75 
Lastly, the court discussed whether the option could be saved 
under the saving statute by shortening the exercise period.76  Howev-
 
68 Id. at 804, 805.  But see Robert E. Parella, Real Property, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 
701-02 (1997) (claiming that a court should balance the disincentives purchase options 
create in improving the property for landlords and the incentives for improvement they pro-
vide the option holder as an alternative to the appurtenant exemption test). 
69 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804-05. 
70 Id. at 805 (“[U]nlike options, preemptive rights . . . in the context of the governmental 
and commercial transaction[s] . . . actually encourage[] the use and development of the land, 
outweighing any minor impediment to alienability.”). 
71 Id. at 804 (stating that “[u]nder the common law, options to purchase land are subject to 
the rule” and further that “[i]t is now settled in New York that, generally, EPTL 9-1.1[] ap-
plies to options.”) (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 806. 
73 Id.; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383. 
74 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806. 
75 Id. (stating that the option was not appurtenant because it was separate from the lease 
agreement, the right to exercise was exempt from any other lease obligation, and the option 
could be exercised beyond the lease term).  But see Parella, supra, note 68, at 702 (claiming 
the appurtenant exemption requirements are “highly formalistic” burdens). 
76 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806-07. 
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er, use of the saving statute requires that a “contrary intention” does 
not appear in the agreement.77  The court held that an option that ex-
plicitly provides for a definite exercise period over twenty-one years 
cannot be revised under the savings statute.78 
IV. OPTIONS TO RENEW RULINGS LEADING UP TO BLEECKER 
STREET 
Clearly, options to purchase were found to be subject to RAP 
under the Symphony Space ruling.79  However, the court was ambi-
guous as to whether its reasoning applied to options to renew.80  
Therefore, after Symphony Space, many New York courts took dif-
ferent approaches to whether an option to renew is subject to and/or 
valid under RAP.81 
Many lower courts determined that options to renew should 
be accorded the same legal analysis as options to purchase; therefore, 
RAP and the appurtenant exception applied to options to renew.82  
For example, in Deer Cross Shopping LLC v. Stop & Shop Super-
market Co.,83 the parties entered into a twenty-five year lease agree-
 
77 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(a) (McKinney 2012). 
78 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 807 (holding that the unambiguous exercise pe-
riod of twenty-four years cannot be “saved” under the saving statute). 
79 See, e.g., Harrington v. Gage, 843 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (App. Div. 2007) (holding option 
to purchase property in a lease to harvest hay was void under RAP and was not saved by the 
appurtenant exception because the option was separable from the lease) (citing Symphony 
Space, 669 N.E.2d at 806). 
80 Inwood Park Apartments, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (“[T]he Court has held that all op-
tions in real estate are subject to the rule against perpetuities.”) (quoting Symphony Space, 
Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 477-78) (emphasis added); see Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804 
(“Under the common law, options to purchase land are subject to [RAP] . . . .”); contra Sym-
phony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804 (“It is now settled in New York that, generally [RAP] 
applies to options.”). 
81 See, e.g., Soldiers‟, Sailors‟, Marines‟, & Airmen‟s Club, Inc. v. Carlton Regency 
Corp., 911 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778-79, 781 (Sup. Ct. 2010), aff’d, Soldiers‟, Sailors‟, Marines‟ & 
Airmen‟s Club, Inc. v. Carlton Regency Corp., 945 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2012) (looking 
at the Restatement (First) of Property in holding a renewal option valid); Deer Cross Shop-
ping LLC v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 773 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (renewal 
options are subject to RAP, but can be saved by the appurtenant exemption). 
82 See, e.g., Double C Realty Corp. v. Craps, LLC, 870 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (Sup. Ct. 2009) 
(option to renew lease met the requirements for the appurtenant exception and was thus not 
void under RAP); Soldiers’, Sailors’, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (citing cases where the appurte-
nant exception was applied). 
83 773 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
11
Vecchi: Repulsed by RAP?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
216 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
ment with three ten-year options to renew.84  The lease provided that 
the tenant give notice of its intent to use its renewal option at least 
eleven months before it would take effect.85  Failure to confer such 
notice required the landlord to furnish the tenant notice of the te-
nant‟s option and allowed a sixty-day extension for the tenant to re-
new.86  If the landlord failed to notify within sixty days, the lease 
term was extended to sixty days after tenant received the reminder 
notice of its renewal options.87 
In determining whether the options to renew were void under 
RAP, the court took note of the appurtenant exemption as articulated 
in Symphony Space, stating that, “options that originate in one of the 
lease provisions, are not exercisable after the lease expires and are in-
capable of separation from the lease, are valid even though the option 
holder‟s interest might vest beyond the perpetuities period.”88  Judge 
Cahn held that the renewal option at issue was appurtenant to the 
lease under this definition because he interpreted the sixty-day exten-
sion to exercise the renewal option as also extending the original 
lease term; therefore, the option was not “exercisable after the lease 
expire[d].”89 
Other courts have devised more individualistic ways of de-
termining the RAP analysis for options to renew.  In 224 Seventh 
Street Associates, LLC v. AMP Management, Inc.,90 the renewal op-
tion was for “an additional period of five (5) years from expiration of 
the lease term . . . .”91  The landlord argued that the option was void 
under RAP because the holder could renew at any time, even after the 
expiration of the lease term.92  Judge Fairgrieve held the option valid 
by choosing an interpretation of the agreement that would render 
RAP inapplicable and by looking at what the landlord and tenant in-
 
84 Id. at 212. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  The opinion provides a discrepancy regarding the notice requirements in the lease; 
however, the terms described are the most logical and the ones most often used by the court 
in its description of the terms. 
88 Deer Cross Shopping LLC, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (citing Symphony Space, Inc., 669 
N.E.2d at 806). 
89 Deer Cross Shopping LLC, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14. 
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tended under the agreement.93  The judge stated that, “[i]t is implied 
that the renewal must take effect before [the lease expires].”94  Fur-
thermore, the judge held that the tenant may exercise his right to re-
new simply by maintaining possession after the lease expires.95 
In Soldiers’, Sailors’, Marines’, & Airmen’s Club, Inc. v. 
Carlton Regency Corp.,96 Judge Ramos relied on the Restatement 
(First) of Property97 in determining whether two, twenty-five year op-
tions to renew were valid.98  The judge held that even though the op-
tion seemed to be a perpetuity at first glance, under the Restatement, 
the landlord‟s argument that the options must be exercised imme-
diately upon the expiration of the initial lease period “renders [RAP] 
inapplicable.”99  Furthermore, the judge acknowledged an interesting 
argument by the tenant, who suggested that the provision should vi-
olate RAP because it placed an “unreasonable restraint on alienation” 
by requiring the tenant to perform repairs during the lease term.100  
The tenant claimed that creating such conditions prevents free aliena-
tion of the property.101  This policy argument is commendable consi-
dering the public policy reasoning made by the Court of Appeals 
when exempting certain preemptive rights in Bruken and creating the 
appurtenant exemption for options.  However, the court ultimately re-
jected this argument stating that New York statutory RAP is meas-
ured “exclusively by the passage of time,” thereby making public 
 
93 Id.  The judge did not provide this analysis under the saving statute; nor was there any 
mention of Symphony Space, Inc. 
94 Id. (claiming that the parties could not have agreed to exercise the option after the lease 
expired). 
95 224 Seventh St. Assocs. LLC, 2010 WL 1463036 (quoting Brooks v. Elabed, 801 
N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Term 2005)). 
96 911 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
97 Id. at 778-79. Restatement (First) of Property § 395 states in pertinent part: 
When a lease limits in favor of the lessee an option exercisable at a time 
not more remote than the end of the lessee‟s term . . . to obtain . . . an ex-
tension of his former lease, then such option is effective, in accordance 
with the terms of the limitation, even when it may continue for longer 
than the maximum period. 
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP: OPTION LIMITED IN FAVOR OF A LESSEE § 395 
(2012)). 
98 Soldiers’, Sailors’, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. 
99 Id. at 779, 781. 
100 Id. at 781. 
101 Id. 
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policy arguments irrelevant.102 
V. BLEECKER STREET TENANTS CORP. V. BLEEKER JONES LLC 
A. The Lease, Background of the Case, and the 
Parties’ Arguments 
On September 1, 1983, the parties entered into a commercial 
lease in which Bleecker Street Tenants Corp. (“Landlord”) was the 
landlord and Bleeker Jones LLC (“Tenant”) was the tenant.103  The 
lease provided for a fourteen-year initial term with nine consecutive 
renewal options.104  Under the lease, an option to renew would be ex-
ecuted when Tenant gave at least six months notice to Landlord of its 
intent to renew before the previous term expired.105  Additionally, the 
options clause provided a “savings provision,” which was at the heart 
of the case.106  The provision states in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event [Tenant] 
has not heretofore timely exercised any renewal op-
tion . . . each such renewal option shall continue to 
remain in effect and [Tenant] may exercise such re-
newal option within sixty (60) days after [Landlord] 
notified [Tenant] in writing of its right to exercise 
each such option, notwithstanding the fact that the 
term of said lease may have expired. If the term shall 
have expired, [Tenant] shall remain in possession as a 
month-to-month tenant until [Landlord] shill [sic] 
have complied with the foregoing.107 
 
102 Id.  The court however does state that the argument would have held weight under 
common law RAP because “the common-law rule evaluate[d] the reasonableness of the 
[condition].”  Soldiers’, Sailors’, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (quoting Symphony Space, Inc., 669 
N.E.2d at 476). 
103 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484. 
104 Id. at 484-85; Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at *8 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. 
Bleeker Jones LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011-0012). 
105 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at *6, Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones 
LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011-0012). 
106 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *8. 
107 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleecker Jones LLC, No. 600053-2008, 2008 WL 
4411822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d, Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., v. Bleeker Jones 
LLC, 882 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011).  The Supreme 
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Simply put, if Tenant failed to provide its sixty-day notice, Tenant 
was entitled to remain in possession as a month-to-month tenant 
without the expiration of any renewal option.108  Landlord then had 
the right to provide sixty days notice of Tenant‟s ability to renew, 
within which time Tenant must renew or the option expired.109 
The original lease term expired on August 31, 1997, without 
Tenant‟s exercising its right to renew; thus, Tenant remained as a 
month-to-month tenant after that date.110  Ten years later, Landlord 
brought the action under discussion, claiming the renewal options 
under the lease violated RAP and were thus void.111  Landlord 
claimed that Symphony Space held that RAP applied to all options.112  
Landlord also argued that the renewal options are not appurtenant to 
the lease, claiming that the month-to-month tenancy, which took ef-
fect when tenant failed to exercise its renewal, was a “holdover pro-
vision” and not an extension of the lease.113  Therefore, Landlord 
claimed that the options to renew could be exercised after the lease 
expired and they could not be saved under the appurtenant exemp-
tion; nor could the option be saved under EPTL § 9.1-3 because the 
options contained no durational limitations, showing the parties‟ in-
tent that the options last indefinitely, and EPTL § 9.1-3 cannot alter 
an unequivocal interpretation of the lease.114 
Tenant argued that renewal options should be exempt from 
RAP because such options promote the public policy behind the 
rule.115  Tenant contended that both Landlord and Tenant benefit 
from the renewal options, to which Tenant provided assurances that it 
 
Court refers to the defendant as “Bleecker Jones LLC,” whereas the Appellate Division and 
the Court of Appeals spell the defendant‟s name as Bleeker Jones LLC.  In its briefs, the de-
fendant spells its name in accordance with the latter.  Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra 
note 105, at *1. 
108 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 485. 
109 Id. 
110 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *9. 
111 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 2008 WL 4411822; Brief for Defendants-Appellants, su-
pra note 105, at *8 (suggesting the Landlord brought this action due to a change in the tax 
law, which allowed Landlord to generate a higher rental income without subjecting itself to 
an increased tax rate). 
112 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *16. 
113 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *29-30.  A holdover tenancy results 
at the expiration of a lease by operation of law and each month is considered a separate con-
tract for a new lease term. Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 46. 
114 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 104, at *36. 
115 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15. 
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could recoup its investment in property and therefore encourage its 
development of the premises.116  Meanwhile, Landlord‟s property be-
came more attractive to potential buyers, as the property came with a 
long-term tenant, making the land more alienable.117  Tenant alterna-
tively argued, if renewal options are subject to the rule, the options in 
the current lease are appurtenant, and therefore exempt from RAP.118  
Lastly, Tenant argued that any ambiguity in the language of the lease 
must be determined in favor of the option‟s validity, as EPTL § 9-1.3 
requires a presumption that the creator of the lease intended it to be 
valid.119 
B. New York Supreme Court Decision 
After both parties sought summary judgment, the Supreme 
Court held that the options to renew in the lease were not barred by 
RAP.120  Although the court noted that Symphony Space involved an 
option to purchase, it also recognized that Deer Cross held a renewal 
option was subject to the appurtenant exemption.121  The Supreme 
Court held that the renewal option at issue did not violate RAP be-
cause it qualified as appurtenant to the lease as the option originated 
in the lease, could only be exercised while the lease was in effect, and 
could not be separated from the lease.122  In so holding, the court re-
jected Landlord‟s claim that the lease expired when Tenant failed to 
give notice of its renewal, but rather held that the month-to-month 
occupancy was a continuation of the lease.123  By holding the renewal 
options valid under the appurtenant exemption, the Supreme Court 
adopted the majority view regarding the applicability of New York‟s 
RAP law on such options: that the exemption was meant to include 
renewal options.124 
 
116 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15. 
117 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15, 19 (arguing that renewal op-
tions are less restrictive than preemptive rights). 
118 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *20, 28 (arguing that the month-
to-month tenancy was not a holdover because Tenant was still subject to the lease terms 
throughout that time period). 
119 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *28. 
120 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 2008 WL 4411822. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (considering the option to be analogous to the option in Deer Cross Shopping LLC). 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  The court failed to address the possibility of exempting renewal options from RAP 
16
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C. Appellate Court Determination 
The Appellate Division also pondered the appurtenant exemp-
tion in determining the validity of the renewal options under RAP.125  
The court focused on the phrase “[i]f the term shall have expired” 
Tenant will become a month-to-month tenant until Landlord provides 
sixty days notice of the renewal.126  The court considered this phrase 
to be the unequivocal intention by the parties to allow Tenant to util-
ize its options after the expiration of the lease.127  The court reasoned 
that the month-to-month tenancy stipulated in the lease was a reitera-
tion of New York‟s default rule upon the expiration of a lease and 
was not an extension of the lease itself.128  As a result of this reason-
ing, the Appellate Division found that the renewal options were not 
appurtenant to the lease because they could be exercised after the 
lease expired.129 
Furthermore, the court held the saving statute could not save 
the options because the only interpretation to be made is one that vi-
olates RAP, and the court cannot rewrite the provision to allow it to 
properly vest.130  Lastly, the court stated that the renewal options in 
the case “call[] to mind the very object of [RAP], „to defeat an intent 
of a . . . grantor to create unreasonably long restrictions upon the use 
or marketability of . . . property.‟ ”131  Therefore, the Appellate Divi-
sion reversed the decision of the Supreme Court.132 
 
for public policy purposes, but did discuss how strict the rule was on contingent interests.  
Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 2008 WL 4411822. 
125 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones LLC, 882 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (App. Div. 
2009), rev’d, Bleecker St. Tenants Corp. v. Bleeker Jones LLC, 945 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2011). 
126 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 Id. at 46 (“This explicit recognition that the lease term expires if not renewed estab-
lishes that the renewal option clause was intended to give the tenant an ability to renew [after 
expiration].”). 
128 Id. (determining that the alternative view is that the lease could last in perpetuity under 
the month-to-month tenancy providing the Landlord never gave notice to Tenant of the re-
newal option). 
129 Id. at 47. 
130 Id. at 46-47. 
131 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (quoting In re Kellogg, 316 N.Y.S.2d 
293, 296 (App. Div. 1970)). 
132 Id. 
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D. New York Court of Appeals Decision 
The Court of Appeals was heavily divided in its reasoning.  
Even so, the majority opinion, written by Judge Jones, was suc-
cinct.133  Unlike the lower courts, the Court of Appeals did not focus 
on the appurtenant exception test, but rather on the treatment of the 
common law on renewal options.  The court noted that under the 
common law, perpetual renewal options were not void under RAP.134  
The court reasoned that since the New York statute is a codification 
of the common law rule, it follows that renewal options should be ex-
empt from New York RAP.135 
Furthermore, the court explored the principles underlying a 
rule against perpetuities.136  The court reiterated that the prime objec-
tive of RAP was always “to protect the alienability of property.”137  
The court then explained that renewal options naturally render the 
lease and the property more alienable by making the property more 
attractive to a potential buyer, should the owner wish to sell.138  The 
court expanded on this reasoning by distinguishing renewal options 
from options to purchase, because renewals do not enable the option 
holder to divest title from the owner139 and are “inherently appurte-
nant to the lease.”140  Lastly, the court noted that the renewal option 
at bar “encourage[s] the efficient use of the property” as it allows a 
tenant to maintain possession without interruption.141 
Judge Read‟s concurring opinion found a number of faults 
with the majority opinion and suggested a different theory as to why 
the renewal option should be valid.142  Judge Read took particular 
 
133 Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Smith, and Pigott concurred in the majority 
opinion. 
134 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Hoff v. Royal Metal Furniture 
Co., 103 N.Y.S. 371 (1907)); see also Edwin H. Abbot, Leases and the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, 27 YALE L. J. 878, 883 (1918) (suggesting that perpetual renewal options were an 
exception to common law RAP). 
135 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
136 Id. at 485. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 487 (noting that renewal options are regularly used in commercial transactions to 
attract potential tenants). 
139 Id. at 486. 
140 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
141 Id. (stating that the option is consistent with the public policy purposes of RAP). 
142 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487-88 (Read, J., concurring). 
18
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note that common law RAP was not applied to perpetual renewal op-
tions.143  She reasoned that perpetual options are different from op-
tions with a definite end date because, in essence, they give the tenant 
a fee simple in the property.144  Therefore, considering that the pur-
pose of RAP has been to invalidate restraints on alienability, perpe-
tual renewal options were rightfully exempted under the common law 
rule.145 
Second, Judge Read noted that the authorities cited by the ma-
jority, showing that non-perpetual renewal options were exempt un-
der common law RAP, were actually cases (and articles about cases) 
that were decided under New York‟s narrow statutory rule, which 
notably excluded options.146  Judge Read concluded that the majori-
ty‟s reasoning for exempting all renewal options “is simply not sup-
ported by the authorities cited.”147 
Judge Read then stated that the Symphony Space ruling was 
intended to encompass all real estate options and thus the appurtenant 
exemption should be applied to lease renewals.148  In determining 
whether the option could be exercised after the lease terminates, 
Judge Read, like the Appellate Division, sought to define the scope of 
the term in the lease.149  The judge found that the lease did not expire 
when the month-to-month tenancy was triggered because the lease 
provided for continuing “rights and responsibilities” during that pe-
riod, which would not have been the case if the month-to-month te-
nancy was a reiteration of the statutory default rule.150  Therefore, 
Judge Read concluded that the option could not be exercised after the 
 
143 Id. at 488. 
144 Id. (quoting William Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22 (1949)). 
145 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488 (Read, J., concurring).  To solidify this 
point, Judge Read discusses Bridges v. Hitchcock, (1715) 2 Eng. Rep. 498 (H.L.) (discussing 
how a perpetual renewal option makes a tenant inclined to improve the property).  Id. at 488-
89. 
146 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 489-490 (Read, J., concurring).  Judge Read 
then notes that the cases cited by the majority would have been saved under the appurtenant 
exemption, had it been available to those renewal options at the time.  Id. at 490. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.  Judge Read notes that the parties only dispute was whether the option could be ex-
ercised after the lease expires; therefore, she restricts her analysis to that part of the appurte-
nant exemption test.  Id. at 491. 
149 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 491 (Read, J., concurring). 
150 Id.  Judge Read provides the example that the tenant must maintain property damage 
insurance of at least $500,000 during the month-to-month tenancy.  Id. 
19
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lease expired and the court should have determined that the renewal 
option was appurtenant to the lease.151 
In Judge Graffeo‟s dissent, she argued that exempting all re-
newal options is inconsistent with the plain meaning of EPTL § 9-
1.1(b) and the holding in Symphony Space.152  Judge Graffeo made 
note of many inconsistencies and poor conclusions in the majority 
opinion.153  She stated that while the majority was correct in noting 
perpetual options to renew were exempt from RAP at the turn of the 
twentieth century, New York was not following the common law rule 
at that time, as the majority assumed.154  Judge Graffeo stated that 
New York had a statutory rule since 1830, which “was drafted so nar-
rowly that it [excluded options].”155  Therefore, the authorities cited 
by the majority as common law decisions were in fact decided under 
the old statute and its reasoning was therefore faulty.156  Furthermore, 
those cases were superseded in 1965, when New York adopted the 
common law rule, which covered options.157 
The dissent further referred to the previous Court of Appeals 
cases that held options were under RAP‟s grasp.158  Judge Graffeo 
stated that these previous rulings alone should prevent the court from 
exempting renewal options as a class.159  The dissent then stated that 
the majority should have applied the appurtenant exception to the re-
newal option and praised the lower courts for taking such a view.160  
The dissent noted two important reasons why the court should have 
adhered to the appurtenant exemption as opposed to the general 
waiver.161  First, Judge Graffeo opposed the majority‟s statement that 
 
151 Id. (agreeing with the Supreme Court‟s decision). 
152 Bleecker Street Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 491 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. at 491-92, 493. 
154 Id. at 492. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 492, 493 (“[T]he early twentieth century decisions that the majority relie[d] on 
were grounded on the absence of a statutory prohibition that applied to perpetual leases.”). 
157 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting).  Judge Graffeo 
also states that the cases cited by the majority were perpetual lease renewals, “which are not 
at issue in this case.”  Id. 
158 Id. at 492-93 (citing Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 804; Wildenstein & Co., 595 
N.E.2d at 832; Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462). 
159 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
160 Id.  The dissent also recognizes other lower court decisions over the past fifteen years 
which applied the appurtenant test in similar circumstances.  Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 
N.E.2d at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
161 Id. at 493-94. 
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an option to renew inherently originates in the lease and therefore is 
always appurtenant.162  She stated that there is no bar against parties 
to a lease that would prevent them from creating an option renewal 
contract after entering into a lease agreement–and in such instances 
the option would fail the appurtenant test and be void under RAP ac-
cording to Symphony Space.163  Additionally, the dissent noted that a 
renewal option could be worded to allow the exercise of the option 
after the original lease expired.164  Judge Graffeo stated that such an 
option would discourage a landlord from improving the property and 
hinder transferability because the option holder possesses his right to 
renew at the old price, after expiration of the original term.165  The 
dissent stated, “[RAP] was designed to deter such barriers to transfe-
rability.”166  Judge Graffeo then reasoned that under the appurtenant 
test, the option at bar would fail and be void under RAP because the 
lease expressly expired when the month-to-month tenancy was trig-
gered and the lease wrongfully allowed the tenant to exercise its op-
tion after the expiration of the lease.167 
VI. THE REALITIES OF THE BLEECKER STREET DECISION 
Considering the New York Court of Appeals‟ line of cases 
over the last twenty-five years, it is not surprising that the court has 
continued to narrow the scope of RAP in Bleecker Street.168  In Folio 
House Inc. v. Barrister Realty Partners,169 the single New York case 
deciding RAP‟s applicability to renewal options since Bleecker 
Street, the court‟s opinion was short, comprised of only a few sen-
tences.  In Folio, the court, in considering whether a renewal option 
could vest after the tenant left possession, simply noted that it “need 




164 Id. at 494. 
165 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 494 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (following the same reasoning as the Appellate Division).  Thus, the difference be-
tween the concurring and dissenting opinions is whether the lease expired when the month-
to-month tenancy was triggered, which has a dispositive outcome on whether the option 
could be exercised after the lease expires. 
168 See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799; Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d 828; 
Bruken, 492 N.E.2d 379. 
169 No. 118068/2009, 2011 WL 1467646 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 2011). 
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language.”170  The court stated that Bleecker Street expressly held 
that RAP does not apply to renewal options and therefore the option 
in the case at bar is not void under RAP.171   
It is very rare in the area of property law, and particularly re-
garding RAP, for there to be a black letter rule because of the strong 
influence of public policy in its application.172  However, in Bleecker 
Street, the Court of Appeals made it very clear that RAP does not ap-
ply to any renewal options in New York State.173  In regard to these 
options, the courts no longer have to determine whether the appurte-
nant exemption applies to analyze the particular option under the 
rule.  Furthermore, the courts do not need to determine whether a re-
newal option that fails RAP on its face may be allowed under the sav-
ing statute.  Such a clear ruling will deter most parties with similar 
disputes from litigating.  The cases that do make it to the courts‟ 
docket can be swiftly resolved.174  In a case on appeal after Bleecker 
Street, the landlord ceded its argument that the renewal option vi-
olated RAP and instead pursued other avenues to void the lease re-
newals.175  Clearly, Bleecker Street  allows courts to avoid the com-
plexity of RAP, at least in the area of lease renewal options. 
A. Benefits of the Bleecker Street Decision 
The court‟s decision in Bleecker Street is also consistent with 
both Bruken and Symphony Space.  The Bruken court found that 
preemptive rights in government and commercial contracts should be 
exempt from RAP because an exemption furthered the policies that 
RAP was designed to advance.176  Similarly, the court in Bleecker 
Street determined that exempting renewal options promoted the poli-
 
170 Id. at *2, *3. (“The Court of Appeals ruling [in Bleecker Street] applies to all options 
to renew leases, and a fortiori, to the lease in this particular case.”). 
171 Id. at *2. 
172 See, e.g., Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (stating the policy goals of 
RAP were a large factor in exempting renewal options); Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383-84 (find-
ing commercial and government preemptive rights were exempt from RAP because “en-
forcement did not violate the underlying purposes of the rule . . . .”). 
173 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484 (“We hold that [RAP] does not apply to 
options to renew leases.”). 
174 This was the situation in Folio House Inc., described above. 
175 Soldiers‟, Sailors‟, Marines‟ & Airmen‟s Club, Inc. v. Carlton Regency Corp., 945 
N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2012). 
176 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 384. 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 1, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/14
2012] REPULSED BY RAP? 227 
 
cies of alienability, fostering productive use of property, and facilitat-
ing exchange.177  By allowing long-term renewal options (i.e., options 
that would typically vest beyond the statutory perpetuities period), a 
tenant may be more inclined to invest in the property to the same ex-
tent as an owner because of his reliance on the indestructibility of his 
option, thereby maximizing productive use of the property.178  The 
landlord may also benefit from such options because of the possibili-
ty of acquiring a long-term tenant.  This is true especially if the lan-
dlord wishes to put the property on the market because renewal op-
tions will make a property more attractive to other investors, thus 
facilitating exchanges.179 
More beneficial is the fact that long-term renewal options as-
sist the surrounding community.  When tenants are inclined to invest 
in property, there is a greater opportunity for revitalization of the sur-
rounding area.180  Not only will tenants be more interested in main-
taining their establishment, but they also will be concerned about the 
neighborhood, local political concerns, and community functions and 
causes.181  Such initiatives become important to a long-term tenant, 
because they affect their clientele, the value of their options and the 
ability to quickly recoup their investment.182  Furthermore, such op-
tions do not hinder the commitment of the landlord, who continues to 
own the land, in enhancing the value of the property and promoting 
the prosperity of the surrounding community.183 
 
177 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
178 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15. 
179 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (finding that renewal options “render[] 
the lease more attractive and readily alienable than less so”); Brief for Defendants-
Appellants, supra note 105, at *15 (stating that renewal options “make the property more 
attractive to a buyer of the landlord‟s interest”). 
180 See Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 715 
(1955) (stating that if a life tenant could invest in currently unproductive property, it could 
become a profitable enterprise). 
181 See Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 143, 170 (2010) (suggesting that a new tenants lack of “social or economic networks,” 
mixed with their uncertainty of future rent increases, negatively impacts their “incentives to 
invest in the community”). 
182 Being able to recoup investments in leased property was an important argument made 
by Tenant.  Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15.  Furthermore, the ar-
gument appears to have resonated with the court, though not explicitly mentioned in the opi-
nion.  Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487.  The court used the same argument in 
Bruken in regard to preemptive rights.  Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383-84. 
183 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *15 (“From the landlord‟s view-
point, the restraint on alienability [if any] is minimal, because the property can still be trans-
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The Bleecker Street decision also alleviates the courts‟ dock-
ets, allowing the judiciary to work more efficiently while providing a 
means for spending less money.  For many years, the court system 
has noted the burden of high cases and low resources, and decisions 
that reduce litigation help to mitigate these costs.184   Claims or de-
fenses based on RAP in the lease renewal context can now be dis-
missed swiftly during pre-trial litigation and at the trial level.185  Fur-
thermore, the economic impact of the ruling extends to landlords and 
tenants.186  RAP‟s application to renewal options can no longer be a 
point of contention, potentially leading to lengthy litigation in court 
and animosity between two parties in a business relationship which 
behooves them to remain amicable. 
The holding of Bleecker Street also promotes the increasingly 
popular conservative views of limited government and free market 
policies.187  Exempting the entirety of renewal options from a strict 
rule allows parties more freedom to contract.188  In agreeing to a re-
newal option, parties, especially tenants, will not have to worry about 
the validity of the option.189  By removing RAP in this circumstance, 
 
ferred subject to the lease.”). 
184 See generally Vincent E. Doyle III, Court Funding: A Statewide Perspective, New 
York State Bar Journal (Jan. 2012) (stating that decreases in court funding further burden 
already overcrowded court systems and create negative effects on litigants and the public); 
see also Richard S. Fries, Amendment to RPAPL Article 14 Allows Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
of Commercial Mortgages, 70-Dec N.Y. St. B.J. 50, *50 (claiming New York‟s cumbersome 
foreclosure process hinders an already overburdened court system). 
185 See generally Folio House Inc., 927 N.Y.S.2d 816 (stating its ruling in a few short pa-
ragraphs). 
186 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (stating renewal options make leases 
more attractive). 
187 See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, GOP Looking for ‘Fresh Blood’, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS 
(Feb. 17, 2012, 4:01PM), http://amarillo.com/opinion/opinion-columnist/weekly-opinion-
columnist/2012-02-17/gop-looking-fresh-blood (“[G]rassroots activists are coalescing 
around a stellar slate of limited government candidates looking to reinforce and reenergize 
the right in Washington.”). 
188 See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No 
Friends – An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 659 (2000): 
We live in a world of default rules. Default rules are those that control in 
absence of a contrary expression and can be easily set aside. It is begin-
ning to seem as though almost every rule of law can be set aside. So 
what is the big deal if we allow grantors to set aside the RAP? 
Id. 
189 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484 (all renewal options are exempt from 
RAP). 
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courts will not interfere with the long-term goals of the tenant.190  The 
tenant will then have the maximum possible chance to recoup any in-
vestment and improvement he made on the property based on the 
availability of the option, without concern about the impact of RAP 
on the option.191  In addition, both parties must assume more personal 
responsibility to ensure that their deal will be profitable.192  Although 
Bleecker Street furthers these conservative objectives, the Court of 
Appeals‟ decision was not a political one.  In fact, Judge Jones‟s ma-
jority opinion garnered support from judges appointed by both demo-
cratic and republican governors.193 
 
B. Contractual Changes and Landlord Repositioning 
Removing RAP‟s statutory restraint on renewal options pro-
vides some protection to the tenant from the landlord.194  A landlord 
is in a better position and more inclined to know about the intricacies 
of a contract and the methods of invalidating provisions which are no 
longer beneficial.195  This ruling prevents the courts from interfering 
and allowing RAP to be one of the possible ways to remove a tenant 
despite the provisions of a negotiated contract.196  Therefore, the rul-
ing is more likely to promote property development through long-
term tenants.197  Of course, it may also decrease the inclination of 
landlords to agree to renewal options in their leases.198 
 
190 See Simes, supra note 180, at 715 (incentivizing a tenant to make long-term improve-
ments makes a more profitable investment). 
191 See Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484. 
192 Soldiers’, Sailors’, 945 N.Y.S.2d 40 (“[T]hat is the deal that plaintiff struck.  
Represented by competent counsel, it negotiated and executed the lease . . . and „the courts 
will not interfere‟ with the economically harsh result.”). 
193 Judges of the Court, COURT OF APPEALS: STATE OF NEW YORK, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (see biography of each judge 
under “Judges of the Court” tab). 
194 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat‟l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(“The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well docu-
mented.”). 
195 Id. 
196 See generally Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d 484. 
197 Id. at 484 (allowing landlords and tenants to enter into perpetual renewal options with-
out invalidation by RAP). 
198 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 111 
(Nov. 1986) (stating that there is an inherent “tension between landlords and tenants over 
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Another inevitable result of this decision is that landlords will 
increase their reliance on providing conditions which accompany re-
newal options.199  Faced with the certainty of an option included as a 
term in the lease, landlords are likely to find unique ways to ensure 
that the renewal option remains favorable to their long-term goals.200  
To protect their interests, the landlords will mainly rely on attaching 
rental increases to any renewal options the tenant exercises.201  With-
out such a condition, and without the possibility of voiding the re-
newal options under RAP, the landlords‟ interests and profits under 
the agreements could diminish quickly, especially in the face of mul-
tiple long-term renewals, perhaps in perpetuity. However, landlords 
should be wary of not providing too many conditions or creating “to 
be determined” rent amounts which may be void for vagueness as a 
matter of contract law.202 
The Bleecker Street decision does not leave landlords unpro-
tected when creating their lease agreements, though it will hinder 
those who utilize RAP as a means of escape when a lease turns 
sour.203  As such, the landlords who continue to offer options to re-
new will likely come up with creative ways to back out of the option, 
because they can no longer hide behind the intricacies of RAP.  One 
such possibility is including a provision in the lease that allows the 
landlord to reject the tenant‟s exercise of an option for cause.204  
Therefore, if the tenant is problematic (i.e. causing excessive damage 
to the premises), and the landlord has the potential for a better busi-
 
lease renewals”). 
199 Hindquarter Corp. v. Prop. Dev. Corp., 631 P.2d 923, 926 (Wash. 1981) (“[P]rompt 
payment of rent [was] a condition precedent to the renewal.”); 88 Am. Jur. Trials § 9 (2003) 
(leases typically require compliance with all conditions of the lease as a condition precedent 
of renewal). 
200 See David E. Pierce, Evaluating the Jurisprudential Bases for Ascertaining or Defining 
Coalbed Methane Ownership, 4 WYO. L. REV. 607, 612 (2004) (stating contracts should be 
interpreted primarily based on the intent of the parties). 
201 Even the Association of Legal Administrators (ALA) entered into leases which con-
tained renewal options with attached 4% rent increases.  A Message from the Executive Di-
rector, ALA News, July 1999, at 32. 
202 Rhee v. Dohan, 457 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (App. Div. 1982) (finding tenant‟s letter was 
unenforceable as creating a lease renewal agreement because it did not stipulate a rent 
amount or provide a commencement date). 
203 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 105, at *8 (claiming landlord wanted to 
terminate the lease because tax code changes made other opportunities more profitable). 
204 See Williams v. Millward & Co., 412 N.W.2d 369, 369 (Minn. 1987) (noting that de-
fendant‟s attempt to exercise his renewal option was rejected for cause). 
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ness opportunity, he will not be forced to continue his relationship 
with his current tenant. 
Similarly, the landlord might provide terms in the lease for a 
potential buy-back of the option.205  Like the denial for cause, this 
will allow the landlord to pursue a better business venture by regain-
ing the unexercised options upon payment of a premium to the cur-
rent tenant.206  The availability of these types of conditions and others 
means that landlords will have an incentive to include renewal op-
tions in their leases without the accompanying uncertainty about their 
validity.207  However, increased reliance on these intricate conditions 
also may lead to longer and more complex leases and, consequently, 
more litigation as the parties quarrel over the provisions‟ meaning 
and intention. 
C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
The concurrence and dissent point out a number of faulty ra-
tionales in the majority opinion.208  Both Judges Read, in her concur-
ring opinion, and Graffeo, in her dissenting opinion, discuss that the 
majority bases its ruling, in part, on identifying the early 1900s as a 
time New York used the common law rule, when in fact the State was 
using the narrow 1830 statutory rule.209  Due to this error, Judge 
Graffeo even argues that the majority fails to provide any authority 
 
205 See Evaluating the Jurisprudential Bases for Ascertaining or Defining Coalbed Me-
thane Ownership, supra note 200, at 612 (“Under the American freedom of contract model, 
absent some flaw in the bargaining process . . . the public interest lies in giving effect to the 
agreement freely made by the parties”); Aaron Bassan, Mortgages to Secure Other Indeb-
tedness: A Statutory Proposal, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 259, 268 (1985) (“[T]he basic prin-
ciples of contract law [are] protecting the parties‟ intent while permitting maximum freedom 
of contract.”).  This idea is similar to the ability of a corporation to buy back outstanding 
shares at a predetermined rate.  See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 
1311, 1313  (N.Y. 1989) (upholding a buy-back agreement which could be exercised without 
cause). 
206 See Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1312 (stating the agreement allowed corporation to buy back 
stock from employee if that employee ceased to be employed by corporation “for any rea-
son”). 
207 James P. McAndrews et al., A Practical Guide to Reviewing a Commercial Lease, 19 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891, 929 (1984) (stating landlords do not want vacant buildings 
and are willing to provide renewal options to prevent such an outcome “provided adequate 
provisions are made” to protect a landlord‟s financial interests). 
208 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487-91 (Read, J., concurring); id. at 491-94 
(Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
209 Id. at 489-90 (Read, J., concurring); id. at 492 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
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that renewal options were exempt from RAP under the common 
law.210  However, all of the judges agree that the purpose of RAP has 
always been to promote alienability and the development of proper-
ty.211  In this respect the majority opinion remains sound.212 
1. The Concurring Opinion‟s Flaws 
A flaw in Judge Read‟s concurring opinion, however, leads to 
an unraveling of her argument.  The judge relies upon distinguishing 
perpetual renewal options from options which have a definite end 
date.213  To further this point she cites to an article by Professor Wil-
liam Berg, who equates a perpetual renewal option with a fee simple 
estate.214  While she never equivocally states so, Judge Read offers 
substantial evidence to suggest that a perpetual renewal option would 
be found valid under RAP and that she would have held the option at 
bar valid had it been an option in perpetuity.215 
There are faults in equating a perpetual renewal option with 
fee simple ownership.  In Berg‟s article, which Judge Read uses as 
authority, he conditions the option‟s “fee simple” status on the expec-
tation that “the value of the land does not drop to the point where the 
rental becomes prohibitive.”216  Such a situation, Berg claims, would 
cause the rent to become unreasonable and the tenant would likely 
decide against exercising his renewal right.217  The problem with a 
fee simple comparison thus becomes apparent: a true fee simple own-
ership right cannot be harmed by fluctuations in the price of real es-
tate whereas the interest in a renewal option hinges on comparative 
 
210 Id. at 493 (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (“[T]he early twentieth century decisions that the 
majority relies on were grounded on the absence of a statutory prohibition that applied to 
perpetual leases.”). 
211 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 485 (majority opinion); id. at 488 (Read, J., 
concurring); id. at 492 (Graffeo, J., dissenting). 
212 See discussion supra detailing how renewal options are beneficial not only for lan-
dlords and tenants, but also for the surrounding community. 
213 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488 (Read, J., concurring) (“[T]he common 
law enforced „perpetual options to renew leases.‟ ”) (quoting majority opinion at 486). 
214 Id. at 488 (Read, J., concurring). 
215 Id. at 488-89, 490.  This hypothesis is based on her extensive reliance on Berg, supra 
note 144 and W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938), as 
authorities, both of which state that perpetual renewal options were exempt from RAP under 
the common law.  Id. 
216 Id. at 488 (citing Berg, supra note 144, at 22). 
217 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488 (Read, J., concurring). 
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market flows.218  For example, if property values drastically drop to 
half of the original value, the landlord‟s ownership rights remain the 
same; he is still the owner of the property. Yet, the tenant‟s interest in 
a lease renewal plunges because it is based on the previous land mar-
ket.  The holder has a better chance of finding a new space at a much 
lower rate than the one stipulated in the renewal because of the 
change in market conditions.  Thus, the tenant‟s interests are severely 
disadvantaged while the landlord‟s rights remain intact; the parties 
are not equally situated.  
 Furthermore, when Berg wrote his article in 1949, significant real 
estate market drops were not a foreseeable possibility.219  However, 
in the twenty-first century, we have seen drastic declines in property 
values in a relatively short period,220 making such a condition much 
more likely than it was in Berg‟s time. 
Therefore, the reality is that perpetual options also include the 
possibility that the option will terminate if the tenant fails to exercise 
his right, and such a situation is more likely to occur during our cur-
rent economic condition or a comparable depressed period.221  Thus, 
a perpetual option and a renewal option with a stated end date are not 
as distinct as Judge Read suggests.  One must think of the phrase, 
“[n]othing lasts forever”–and that maxim includes “perpetual” op-
tions.222 
 
218 Neil Z. Auerbach, A Transactional Approach to Lease Analysis, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
309, 352 (1985) (stating that the lower the renewal rate compared to the current fair rental 
value, the greater the economic benefit on the option holder). 
219 See Kevin Drum, Chart of the Day: Housing Prices Since WWII, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 
24 2010 1:23 PM), http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/08/chart-day-housing-prices-
wwii (“[I]f you look at a fifty-year period after World War II, home prices were absolutely 
steady.”). 
220 See Calculated Risk, Summary for Week Ending December 30th, CALCULATED RISK: 
FINANCE AND ECONOMICS (Dec. 31, 2011 9:00 AM), 
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2011_12_01_archive.html (“Nineteen of the 20 cities 
covered by the indices . . . saw home prices decrease over the month.  The 10- and 20-City 
composites posted annual returns of -3.0% and -3.4% versus October 2010, respectively.”) 
221 Furthermore, during any era, a perpetual option can also be terminated if the tenant 
fails to exercise his right (or give notice to the landlord of his intent) to renew according to 
the terms of the lease. 
222 See Voyles v. Sasser, 472 S.E.2d 80, 81-82 (Ga. 1996) (giving credence to deposition 
testimony that contracting parties never discussed duration and “nothing lasts forever”). 
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2. The Dissenting Opinion‟s Criticism and the Potential 
to Alleviate Those Concerns 
Judge Graffeo also criticizes the majority‟s claim that renewal 
options are “inherently appurtenant to the lease.”223  She reminds the 
majority that one of the requirements for an appurtenant option is that 
the option must originate in the lease.224  She then provides the ex-
ample that an option agreement can be executed in a document com-
pletely separate from the lease agreement, perhaps even years after 
the lease has been in effect.225  Not only does Judge Graffeo‟s scena-
rio indicate that a renewal option can originate outside the lease, but 
she also demonstrates that it could be exercised after its expiration.226  
When a renewal option is included in a separate agreement, it may 
not be subject to the time restraints of the lease.227  Therefore, con-
trary to the statements by the majority, it appears that a renewal op-
tion may violate all three requirements for the appurtenant exemption 
as articulated in Symphony Space.228 
A court may adopt several interpretations that would not al-
low a renewal option to become exercisable after the termination of 
the lease.  First, the court could find that when the lease term ends so 
does the option to renew, regardless of a provision for an extended 
date for the tenant to exercise the option.229  This interpretation would 
not only mean that a renewal option could not be exercised after the 
lease expires, but also that it could be connected to the intention of 
the parties.230  The parties could not intend for there to be a renewal 
after termination; such a situation would not constitute a renewal, but 
 
223 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 494 (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (quoting major-
ity opinion) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
224 Id. at 493. 
225 Id. at 493-94. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 494 (“[I]t could be drafted so that the ability to exercise the option is independent 
from the lease . . . .”). 
228 See Warren St. Assocs. v. City Hall Tower Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (App. Div. 
1994) (holding six twenty-five year renewal options failed the appurtenant test because they 
could be exercised after the lease expired); Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806. 
229 Simons v. Young, 155 Cal. Rptr. 460, 466 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that option to re-
new billboard lease expired with the lease even though the agreement stipulated renewal 
could be exercised three months after lease expiration because it would be “nonsensical” for 
a lease to be “ „renewed‟ after it had expired”). 
230 Id. (stating expiration of renewal with the lease furthers the intent of the parties be-
cause all other rights, including the right of possession, expire with the lease). 
30
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 1, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/14
2012] REPULSED BY RAP? 235 
 
rather a creation of a new lease.231  Alternatively, the majority claims 
that any option that allows the tenant to exercise an option after for-
feiting possession is an option to enter into a new lease.232  However, 
the former interpretation is more logical as a person generally renews 
before term expiration.233 
A second interpretation to prevent the exercise of options af-
ter the lease expires is that upon expiration of the lease term, an un-
exercised option to renew is converted into an option to create a new 
lease under the specified terms.234  Certainly, this approach resolves 
the problem of creating options exercisable after the lease term, but it 
also can create new difficulties in practice.235  For example, it would 
be possible for the original tenant to exercise an option after removal 
from possession and a new tenant is in place.236  Regardless of its 
negative effects, however, these two interpretations would help cor-
rect the majority‟s statement that renewal options are inherently ap-
purtenant.  This is especially true if these alternative interpretations 
are coupled with a requirement that the option to renew either be 
created with the lease or subsequently added to the lease.237  In this 
situation, based on the analysis in Symphony Space, renewal options 
would always be appurtenant.238 
An examination of the majority‟s decision reveals that it dis-
regarded the court‟s analysis of the appurtenant exemption in Sym-
phony Space.239  The majority expressly states that if a renewal option 
 
231 See Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (majority opinion) (stating that an 
option exercised by a former tenant is an option to enter into a new lease, not a renewal op-
tion). 
232 Id. (responding to the dissent‟s arguments that the holding allows a former tenant to 
exercise a renewal right after the lease expires). 
233 This is true in all facets of life, not only in the landlord-tenant context.  For example, a 
customer does not pay utility bills only after the electricity is turned off, nor does a driver 
purchase gas only after the car has stopped running. 
234 See Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (“[A]n option exercisable by a for-
mer tenant no longer in possession is not a renewal option: it is an option to enter into a new 
lease.”). 
235 See id. at 493-94 (Read, J., dissenting). 
236 Id. 
237 See Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (stating one of the elements of the appur-
tenant exemption is that the option “is incapable of separation from the lease”). 
238 Id. 
239 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (“[A]n option to renew a lease (1) is 
exercisable pursuant to the lease agreement and [is], thus, inherently appurtenant to the 
lease . . . .”). 
31
Vecchi: Repulsed by RAP?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
236 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
is pursuant to the lease, then it is appurtenant.240  Therefore, the ma-
jority concludes that since all renewal options are in furtherance of 
their respective leases, they are appurtenant.241  But, this description 
takes into account none of the elements of the Symphony Space ap-
purtenant exemption.242  Perhaps what the majority meant to articu-
late was that a renewal option is always connected to and in further-
ance of the greater landlord-tenant relationship, thus, using the term 
appurtenant in its broader non-legal context.243  Alternatively, though 
less plausible, the statement could connote an even broader definition 
of the appurtenant exemption, furthering limiting New York‟s statu-
tory RAP law.244 
D. An Alternate Rationale 
Even with the flaws mentioned by the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions, the majority opinion provides the most promising out-
come not only because of the benefits for landlords, tenants, and the 
community, but also due to its furtherance of the common law public 
policy.245  Since long before the days of King Henry VIII, there has 
been a battle between landowners and courts regarding the control of 
property and the validity of long-term restrictions and future inter-
ests.246  Since RAP‟s premiere in The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, its 
purpose has been to promote the development of land and facilitate 
alienability.247  While the majority‟s authorities and reasoning may be 
faulty and unclear, the underlying argument is undeniably true–
renewal options inherently further the common law purpose (and 




242 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806. 
243 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 67 (Robert B. Costello et al., 3d ed. 
1997) defines appurtenance as “[s]omething added to a more important thing; an appen-
dage.” 
244 See Lance Liebman, Forward: The New Estates, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 819, 825 n.31 
(1997) (expressing surprise that the Court of Appeals failed “to adapt [RAP] to modern con-
ditions” by not exempting commercial options from RAP in Symphony Space). 
245 See generally Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d 484. 
246 See Haskins, supra note 6, at 27-29 (discussing the strain between judges seeking 
“freely alienable” land and landowners attempting long-term dead hand control). 
247 Id. at 20. 
248 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
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In its opinion, the majority should have focused more on the 
public policy reasons for exempting renewal options from RAP as 
opposed to discussing the appurtenant exemption.249  While the court 
briefly mentioned the benefits which accrue to landlords by the re-
newal option immunity, it did not discuss the advantages to the tenant 
and, more importantly, the community.250  Furthermore, the majority 
would have strengthened its argument by discussing the parallels be-
tween the public policy reasons for exempting commercial preemp-
tive rights in Bruken and exempting all renewal options in Bleecker 
Street.251  Lastly, because this case revolved around the statutory in-
terpretation of New York RAP, the court was correct to briefly de-
scribe the legislative intent to exempt renewal options in the drafting 
of the statute.252  The problem with Judge Jones‟s consideration of 
this point is his discussion of the exemption of perpetual renewal op-
tions under the common law without explaining why that equates to 
an exemption of all renewal options under the statute.253  However, 
this gap could have been bridged by a simple deduction.  If subject to 
RAP, perpetual renewal options are potentially the most egregious 
violators of the lives in being plus twenty-one year statutory (and 
common law) period.254  If such options are exempt, then clearly, a 
renewal option which violates RAP by a shorter time period should 
be included in the exemption.  With these modifications and focus, 
the majority opinion would have been more persuasive in arguing for 
exempting renewal options and would have quelled some of the con-
cerns of the concurring and dissenting opinions.255 
 
249 See generally id. 
250 See id.  These arguments were made by Tenant in its brief. Brief for Defendant-
Appellants, supra note 105, at *15. 
251 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 383 (stating that any hindrance to alienability caused by the 
right is “properly offset by [its] utility in modern legal transactions . . . .”). 
252 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487 (claiming that because perpetual renew-
al options were exempt from RAP under the common law, and the New York statute codifies 
the common law, renewal options should be exempt in New York). 
253 Id. at 486-87. 
254 See Gleason v. Tompkins, 375 N.Y.S.2d 247, 252 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (perpetual is syn-
onymous with “forever,” “for all time[],” and “everlasting,” clearly in violation of lives in 
being plus twenty-one years). 
255 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 488-90 (Read, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the majority only cites authorities that exempt perpetual options without any reasoning for 
exempting all options and questioning the majority‟s claim that all renewal options are ap-
purtenant); id. at 493-94 (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority‟s authorities are 
faulty and providing examples of renewal options that would not be appurtenant).  Neither 
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Additionally, courts should not take on the tedious task of de-
termining whether RAP is violated and then perhaps applying the ap-
purtenant exemption test when the only reason for doing so is the 
mere existence of the common law rule.256  As the common law has 
adapted to the ever changing modern era, courts have become more 
reasonable in their application to ensure outcomes that are more fair 
and beneficial, not only to the parties but also to the public.257  The 
court‟s decision in Bleecker Street simply furthers the development 
of the common law to promote modern transactions.258 
 
E.     RAP’s Continued Place in New York Law 
 
Although the court found that RAP should not be applied to 
renewal options, RAP still has its importance in other areas of law.259  
Just like commercial and governmental preemptive rights, renewal 
options are part of a niche group of property rights where the non-
enforcement of RAP actually furthers the policy reasons RAP was in-
tended to promote.260  Alternatively, exempting the distribution of 
property from RAP would yield a contrary result.261  Clearly, the 
common law purpose to promote alienability of property would be 
violated.262  Additionally, transferors or testators could then restrict 
the sale or transfer of property in perpetuity, resulting in a smaller in-
 
the concurring opinion nor the dissenting opinion suggests that applying RAP to renewal 
options is beneficial for public policy purposes or claims that the majority‟s discussion of 
public policy is flawed.  See generally id. 
256 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (stating that some options further the public 
policy objectives of common law RAP). 
257 See, e.g., id. (holding appurtenant options to purchase are exempt from RAP); Bruken, 
492 N.E.2d at 384 (holding RAP does not apply to preemptive rights in commercial or go-
vernmental transactions). 
258 See Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (holding RAP does not apply to purchase 
options that meet the appurtenant exemption); Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 833 (stating 
RAP does not apply to personal property interests in commercial transactions); Bruken, 492 
N.E.2d at 384 (holding RAP does not apply to commercial and governmental preemptive 
rights). 
259 Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (voiding purchase option under RAP in part 
because it deters development of the land); id. at 808 (rejecting the “wait and see” approach 
to RAP in part because of RAP‟s importance in the area of wills). 
260 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 487. 
261 Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 381 (RAP was intended to “restrict family dispositions” that 
created “embarrassing impediments to alienability”). 
262 Id. 
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centive for current landowners to develop the property.263  This 
would result because the landlord would have to wait a longer period 
of time to recoup his investment considering that a sale of the proper-
ty is no longer a viable option.  Furthermore, the community would 
also suffer due to this disincentive of development.264 
Even with these negative results a number of states have ab-
olished common law RAP by statute.265  Other states have created 
new and separate rules that apply to the vesting of options.266  How-
ever, deciphering the potential results of such an extreme legislative 
determination shows that it is not in the best interests of the parties or 
the public.267  Rather, with the Bleecker Street, Bruken, Symphony 
Space, and Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis268 opinions, New York 
has found an effective balance for when RAP should be applied and 
when rights should be exempt.  Together, these four decisions exempt 
the rights that further the public policy of RAP as well as provide a 
means for other types of rights to be exempted on an individual level 
if it is found that they are appurtenant.269  Meanwhile, New York still 
enforces RAP in situations in which non-enforcement would cause 
broad public policy concerns.270 
RAP has long been one of the most confusing and misinter-
preted aspects of the law.271  Unfortunately for New York lawyers, 
 
263 See, e.g., id. at 383-84 (reasoning that in only limited circumstances is the non-
enforcement of RAP used to further the alienability of property). 
264 Controlling Residential Stakes, supra note 181, at 170 (suggesting uncertainty lowers 
incentive to invest). 
265 Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: 
R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2103 (May 2003) (“[A]t least fourteen 
states and the District of Columbia have abolished a rule that has been in place for four cen-
turies.”).  These states include Florida, New Jersey, and Virginia.  Id. at n.31. 
266 Patricia Y. Reyhan, Perpetuities Perpetuated: Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop-
erties, Inc., 60 ALB. L. REV. 1259, 1270-71 (1997) (citing a Massachusetts Law which gives 
option holders a flat thirty year period to exercise their right, even if the express terms of the 
option agreement go beyond that period). 
267 See generally Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718 
(Aug. 1983) (discussing the negative effects of broad changes to RAP). 
268 595 N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1992). 
269 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484; Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 
806; Wildenstein & Co., 595 N.E.2d at 833; Bruken, 492 N.E.2d at 384. 
270 See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 806 (holding option that deterred de-
velopment and was not appurtenant was void under RAP); Morrison, 556 N.E.2d at 646 
(holding RAP applies to residential preemptive rights because “lives in being” and “twenty-
one years” become more relevant restrictions). 
271 Haskins, supra note 6, at 20. 
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the Bleecker Street decision does not help solve the complexity of 
RAP as it applies to other rights.272  Therefore, it is likely that despite 
the Bleecker Street decision, there will continue to be cases regarding 
RAP, its misinterpretation, and the resulting unnecessary costs to 
clients due to attorney confusion.  Just nine months after the Bleecker 
Street case, a decision was rendered in a case in which a landlord 
failed to understand the application of RAP.273  The landlord was 
seeking to avoid a very unprofitable ninety-nine year lease by using 
RAP as an argument.274  In its decision, the court reminded plaintiff‟s 
counsel that RAP only applies to future contingent rights, not vested 
ones.275  Therefore, although Bleecker Street simplifies RAP as it per-
tains to renewal options (since no application is required), the deci-
sion does not promote a greater understanding of RAP as it applies in 
other circumstances.276 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Bleecker Street decision is the most recent case by the 
New York Court of Appeals that limits the reach of RAP to particular 
contingent interests.  Even though the majority opinion contained a 
number of flaws, the public policy effects it has on parties‟ freedom 
of contract, the benefits and protections to landlords and tenants, and 
the advantages to the general community make the decision consis-
tent with RAP‟s common law purpose of alienability of property.  
The decision also allows the legal community to be more at ease 
when drafting leases.  Perhaps, in the future, the New York Court of 
Appeals will exempt other interests from RAP, further reflecting the 
court‟s and the public‟s interest in adapting RAP to coincide with 
modern legal transactions.  However, based on its focus on the com-
mon law and public interest concerns in this area, the court seems un-
likely to create significant exemptions to RAP in the future. 
 
272 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484 (limiting holding to renewal options). 
273 U.T.O.S. Inc. v. DeBaron Associates LLC, 932 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
274 Id. at 469. 
275 Id. at 470 (“Plaintiff‟s argument . . . is misplaced.”). 
276 Bleecker St. Tenants Corp., 945 N.E.2d at 484. 
36
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 1, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/14
